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Abstract
In this paper we apply generalized iteration methods to prove comparison results which show how fixed
points of a multifunction can be bounded by least and greatest fixed points of single-valued functions. As
an application we prove existence and comparison results for fixed points of multifunctions. These results
are applied to normal-form games, by proving existence and comparison results for pure and mixed Nash
equilibria and their utilities.
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1. Introduction
In [6] it is shown that when a normal-form game Γ = {S1, . . . , SN ,u1, . . . , uN } of N players
is supermodular and also simple, i.e., the strategy spaces Si are complete lattices in R, then also
the mixed extension of Γ is supermodular. As stated in [6], this result does no longer hold if
the spaces Si are multi-dimensional. Despite of this drawback one of the main results of [6],
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is proved in [7] for certain supermodular normal-form games whose strategy spaces Si are or-
der closed sublattices of separable lattice-ordered Banach spaces, and the values of the utility
functions ui are in ordered separable Banach spaces. The main tools are generalized iteration
methods introduced in [8].
In this paper we shall continue the study started in [7]. In Section 2 we derive by generalized
iteration methods two comparison results, in which fixed points of a multifunction F :X → 2X
on a partially ordered set X are bounded by least and greatest fixed points of single-valued
increasing functions defined on subsets of X. These results are then used to derive existence and
comparison results for fixed points of F . Only partial monotonicity conditions are assumed for F
in X.
The results of Section 2 are applied in Section 3 to a normal-form game Γ = {S1, . . . , SN ,
u1, . . . , uN } of N players whose strategy spaces Si are compact sublattices of ordered Polish
spaces, and the utility functions ui defined on S = S1 ×· · ·×SN are vector-valued. We shall first
prove that if Γ has so-called partially mixed strategic complementarities, then among all possible
Nash equilibria of Γ formed by mixed strategies, i.e., probability measures on Si ordered by first-
order stochastic dominance, there exist least and greatest. Moreover, their strategies are pure, that
is, they are indicator functions of singletons {s1}, . . . , {sN } and {s1}, . . . , {sN }. Conditions under
which one of the utilities ui(s1, . . . , sN) and ui(s1, . . . , sN ) majorize the expected utilities at each
mixed Nash equilibrium of Γ are also presented. We shall also prove comparison results for Nash
equilibria of normal-form games whose utility functions depend on the parameter. A property
called upper semi-closeness is used instead of upper semi-continuity to prove the existence of
maximum points of utility functions.
In Section 4 we present special cases to results of Section 3. First we consider the case when
the utility functions ui of a normal-form game Γ = {S1, . . . , SN ,u1, . . . , uN } are real-valued,
supermodular in si and have increasing differences. We prove that least and greatest mixed Nash
equilibria of such a game exist in pure strategies. The dependence of Nash equilibria on the
parameter is also studied, and the above stated comparison results for expected utilities are shown
if each ui(s1, . . . , sN ) is increasing or decreasing in sj , j = i.
In the non-mixed case the results of Section 3 imply that a normal-form game Γ =
{S1, . . . , SN ,u1, . . . , uN } has least and greatest Nash equilibria s1, . . . , sN and s1, . . . , sN in S if
Γ has (ordinal) strategic complementarities defined in [13]. Moreover, utilities at least (greatest)
Nash equilibrium majorize the utilities at each other Nash equilibrium of Γ when ui(s1, . . . , sN )
is decreasing (increasing) in sj , j = i. A result dealing with monotone dependence on the para-
meter is also presented for Nash equilibria of a family of normal-form games. The vector-valued
functions sj → ui(s1, . . . , sN ), j = i, are not assumed to be continuous, as done in the real-
valued case in [13].
Results of Sections 3 and 4 justify the conclusion that dealing with extremal Nash equilibria
and their utilities there is quite a general class of normal-form games for which randomization
of strategies does not give any benefit. The main difficulty in the proof of these results is that the
space of probability measures on Si ordered by first-order stochastic dominance is not a lattice if
Si is not a chain. As stated in [6]: “This implies that we lack the mathematical structure needed
for the theory of complementarities.” To overcome this difficulty we use generalized iteration
methods in the proofs of the basic comparison lemmas in Section 2.
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By a partially ordered set (poset) we mean a nonempty set X equipped with a reflexive, anti-
symmetric and transitive order relation ‘.’ If x  y and x = y, denote x < y. A sequence (xn)
of X is called increasing if xn  xm whenever nm, decreasing if xm  xn whenever n m,
and monotone if (xn) is increasing or decreasing. A function f from a poset X = (X,) to
another poset Y = (Y,) is called increasing if f (x) f (y) whenever x  y.
Let S be a nonempty subset of a poset X = (X,). If z ∈ X and x  z for all x ∈ S, then z is
called an upper bound of S. If z y for all other upper bounds y of S, we say that z is the least
upper bound of S, and denote z = supS. If z = supS ∈ S, we say that z is the greatest element
of S, and denote z = maxS. A lower bound, a greatest lower bound infS and a least element
minS of S are defined similarly.
The following result is proved in [8, Theorem 1.2.1].
Lemma 2.1. Given a poset P = (P,), a mapping G :P → P and a ∈ P , there exists exactly
one well-ordered chain C (i.e., each nonempty subset of C has the least element) in P , called a
w.o. chain of G-iterations of a, such that
a = minC, and if a ≺ p ∈ P, then p ∈ C iff p = supG[{q ∈ C | q ≺ p}]. (2.1)
If a is a lower bound of G[P ], if G is increasing, and if p = supG[C] exists, then p is the least
fixed point of G. Moreover,
p = maxC = min{p ∈ P ∣∣G(p) p}. (2.2)
Our basic comparison lemma reads as follows.
Lemma 2.2. Given a poset X = (X,) and a ∈ P ⊂ X, assume that a function G :P → P and
a multifunction F :X → 2X have the following properties:
(ha) G is increasing, a is a lower bound of G[P ], and well-ordered chains of G[P ] have supre-
mums in X and they belong to P .
(hb) a is a lower bound of F[X] =⋃x∈XF(x), and if p  x in X and p ∈ P , then G(p) y
for all y ∈F(x).
Then G has the least fixed point p, and if x is any fixed point of F , i.e., x ∈F(x), then p  x.
Proof. Let C be the w.o. chain of G-iterations of a. To show that G[C] is well-ordered, let A
be a nonempty subset of G[C]. The set B = {p ∈ C | G(p) ∈ A} is nonempty. Since C is well-
ordered, then q = minB exists, and G(q) = minA because G is increasing. This proves that
G[C] is well-ordered, whence p = supG[C] exists and belongs to P by the hypothesis (ha).
Moreover, p is the least fixed point of G by Lemma 2.1. To prove that p is a lower bound to all
fixed points of F , assume on the contrary the existence of an element x of X such that x ∈F(x)
and p  x. Since p = maxC and C is well-ordered, there exists the least element p of C such
that p  x. Because x ∈F(x), then a = minC  x by (hb), whence a ≺ p. If q ∈ C and q ≺ p,
then q  x, whence G(q) x by (hb). Thus x is an upper bound of the set G[{q ∈ C | q ≺ p}].
But p is by (2.1) the least upper bound of G[{q ∈ C | q ≺ p}], whence p  x, which contradicts
with the choice of p. Consequently, p  x for each fixed point x of F . 
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fixed points of multifunctions.
Theorem 2.1. Given a poset X = (X,) and a ∈ P ⊂ X, assume that a multifunction
F :X → 2X has the following properties:
(h0) If x ∈ X, then a  y for all y ∈F(x).
(h1) If p ∈ P , then minF(p) exists in X, it belongs to P and is a lower bound of ⋃{F(x) |
p  x}.
(h2) Well-ordered chains of {minF(p) | p ∈ P } have supremums in X and they belong to P .
Then F has a least fixed point, and it belongs to P .
Assume thatF ′ :X → 2X is another multifunction with properties (h0)–(h2) and the following
property:
(h3) minF ′(p)minF(p) for each p ∈ P .
If p′ is the least fixed point of F ′ and p is the least fixed point of F , then p′  p.
Proof. The hypothesis (h1) ensures that defining
G(p) := minF(p), p ∈ P, (2.3)
we obtain an increasing mapping G :P → P . Moreover, a is by (h0) a lower bound of G[P ],
and the hypothesis (h2) means that well-ordered chains of G[P ] have supremums in X and they
belong to P . Thus the hypothesis (ha) of Lemma 2.2 holds. The hypotheses (h0) and (h1) and
the definition (2.3) of G imply that also the hypothesis (hb) of Lemma 2.2 is valid. Thus G has
by Lemma 2.2 the least fixed point p. Because p = G(p) = minF(p) ∈ F(p), then p is also a
fixed point of F , which is by Lemma 2.2 a lower bound for all fixed points of F . Consequently,
p is the least fixed point of F , and p = minF(p) ∈ P by (h1).
To prove the last assertion, let F ,F ′ :X → 2X satisfy the hypotheses (h0)–(h3), and let p and
p′ denote the least fixed points of F and F ′. The above proof implies that p′ is the least fixed
point of the mapping G′ := p → minF ′(p). Since p ∈ P , then
G′(p) = minF ′(p)minF(p) = G(p) = p.
This implies by (2.2) with G replaced by G′ that p′  p. 
The dual results of Lemma 2.2 and Theorem 2.1 are based on the following lemma which is a
consequence of [8, Proposition 1.2.1].
Lemma 2.3. Given a poset P = (P,), a mapping G :P → P and b ∈ P , there exists exactly
one inversely well-ordered chain D (i.e., each nonempty subset of D has the greatest element)
in P , called an i.w.o. chain of G-iterations of b, such that
b = maxD, and if P 	 p ≺ b, then p ∈ D iff p = infG[{q ∈ D | p ≺ q}]. (2.4)
If b is an upper bound of G[P ], if G is increasing, and if p = infG[D] exists, then p is the
greatest fixed point of G. Moreover,
p = minD = max{p ∈ P ∣∣p G(p)}. (2.5)
S. Heikkilä / J. Math. Anal. Appl. 332 (2007) 315–333 319The following result which is dual to Lemma 2.2 is a consequence of Lemma 2.3 and the
proof is similar to that of Lemma 2.2.
Lemma 2.4. Given a poset X = (X,) and b ∈ P ⊂ X, assume that a function G :P → P and
a multifunction F :X → 2X have the following properties:
(Ha) G is increasing, b is an upper bound of G[P ], and inversely well-ordered chains of G[P ]
have infimums in X and they belong to P .
(Hb) b is an upper bound of F[X] =⋃x∈XF(x), and if x  p in X and p ∈ P , then y G(p)
for all y ∈F(x).
Then G has the greatest fixed point p, and if x is any fixed point of F , then x  p.
As an application of Lemma 2.4 we obtain the following existence and comparison result for
fixed points of multifunctions which is dual to that of Theorem 2.1 and its proof is similar.
Theorem 2.2. Given a poset X = (X,) and b ∈ P ⊂ X, assume that a multifunction
F :X → 2X has the following properties:
(H0) If x ∈ X, then y  b for all y ∈F(x).
(H1) If p ∈ P , then maxF(p) exists in X, it belongs to P and is an upper bound of ⋃{F(x) |
x  p}.
(H2) Inversely well-ordered chains of {maxF(p) | p ∈ P } have infimums in X and they belong
to P .
Then F has a greatest fixed point, and it belongs to P .
Assume that F ′ :X → 2X is another multifunction with properties (H0)–(H2) and
(H3) maxF ′(p)maxF(x) for each p ∈ P .
If p′ is the greatest fixed point of F ′ and p is the greatest fixed point of F , then p′  p.
Remark 2.1. Classical fixed point theorems in chain complete posets or in complete lattices (cf.,
e.g., [1,2,4,12,15–17,22,23]) do not provide tools to prove the comparison results of Lemmas 2.2
and 2.4 and Theorems 2.1 and 2.2. According to the hypotheses of these lemmas and theorems
some values of F may be empty. Moreover, only a partial monotonicity condition is imposed
on F in X. This property is needed in the applications of the next section.
3. Existence and comparison results for pure and mixed Nash equilibria of a normal-form
game
We say that a nonempty subset S of a poset X is directed upward if to each pair x, y of
elements of S there corresponds a z ∈ S such that x  z and y  z. S is called a join sublattice
of X if x ∨ y := sup{x, y} exists in X and belongs to S for all x, y ∈ S. If x ∧ y := inf{x, y}
exists in X and belongs to S for all x, y ∈ S, we say that S is a meet sublattice. If S is both meet
and join sublattice, we say that S is a sublattice. S is a chain if x  y or y  x for all x, y ∈ S.
320 S. Heikkilä / J. Math. Anal. Appl. 332 (2007) 315–333By an ordered metric space we mean a metric space X = (X,d) equipped with such a partial
ordering  that the order intervals [a) = {x ∈ X | a  x} and (b] = {x ∈ X | x  b} are closed
subsets of X for all a, b ∈ X.
Let X be a real vector space endowed with a partial ordering . If x  y implies that x + z
y + z for all z ∈ X and αx  αy for all α  0, we say that X is an ordered vector space. The
set X+ = {x ∈ X | 0  x} is called an order cone of X. If X is equipped with a Banach norm
‖ · ‖, and if X+ is a closed subset of X = (X,‖ · ‖), we say that X = (X,‖ · ‖,) is an ordered
Banach space. The order cone X+ is called regular if all order bounded and increasing sequences
of X+ converge. As for examples of ordered Banach spaces with regular order cones see, e.g.,
[8, Sections 1.3 and 5.8].
Given a metric space S and an ordered metric space Y , a mapping f :S → Y is called upper
semi-closed if xn → x in S, f (xn) → y in Y and (f (xn)) is increasing imply that y  f (x). If S
is a sublattice we say that f is quasisupermodular if for all x, x′ ∈ S, f (x ∧ x′) f (x) implies
f (x′) f (x ∨ x′), and f (x ∧ x′) < f (x) implies f (x′) < f (x ∨ x′).
The following result is used in the sequel to solve the maximization problems involved in
Nash equilibria.
Lemma 3.1. Let S be a compact metric space and E an ordered separable Banach space with
regular order cone. If a mapping f :S → E is upper semi-closed, and if its range f [S] is directed
upward and bounded from above, then the set argmaxf of the maximum points of f is nonempty
and compact. If S is lattice and f is quasisupermodular, then argmaxf is a sublattice of S.
Proof. Since f [S] is separable, there exists a countable subset B = {zn}mn=1, 1  m ∞, of
f [S] such that the closure B of B in E contains f [S]. Denote y1 := z1, and when yk is chosen, let
znk be the first element of the sequence (zn)mn=1, if exists, such that znk  yk , and let yk+1 ∈ f [S]
be an upper bound of {znk , yk}. If the so obtained sequence (yk) is finite, it has a maximum y,
and we choose x ∈ S such that y = f (x). If the sequence (yk) is infinite, choose a sequence
(xk)
∞
k=1 from S such that yk = f (xk), k = 1,2, . . . . By the above construction (f (xk))∞k=1 is
an increasing sequence in f [S]. Because f [S] is bounded from above and the order cone of
E is regular, then y = limk f (xk) exists in E. Since S is compact, the sequence (xk)∞k=1 has a
convergent subsequence (xki )∞i=1. Denote x = limi xki . Because limi f (xki ) = y, the sequence
(f (xki ))
∞
i=1 is increasing and f is upper semi-closed, then y  f (x). The above construction
and [8, Proposition 1.1.3] imply that y is in both cases an upper bound of B . Since (y] is closed,
then f [S] ⊂ B ⊂ (y] ⊂ (f (x)], so that x is a maximum point of f .
To prove that the set argmaxf of the maximum points of f is compact, let (xn) be a sequence
in argmaxf . Because S is compact, then (xn) has a subsequence (xnk ) which converges to a
point x of S. Since f (xnk ) = maxf for each k, then limk f (xnk ) = maxf . Because f is upper
semi-closed, then maxf  f (x), whence f (x) = maxf , and x ∈ argmaxf .
Assume next that S is also a lattice, and that f is quasisupermodular. The proof of [13, Theo-
rem 2.7.2] can be applied also in the present case to show that argmaxf is a sublattice of S. 
We say that an ordered metric space S = (S, d,) is an ordered Polish space if S is complete
and separable, and if the partial ordering  is closed in the sense that xn → x, yn → y and
xn  yn for each n imply x  y. For instance, nonempty and closed subsets of separable ordered
Banach spaces are ordered Polish spaces.
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of probability measures on S, i.e., the space of all countably additive functions p :B→ [0,1] for
which p(S) = 1. By [10, Theorem 2] the first-order stochastic dominance , defined by
(SD) p  q if and only if p(A) q(A) for each A ∈ B which is increasing, i.e., [x) ⊂ A when-
ever x ∈ A,
is a partial ordering on Σ .
The next comparison result is a consequence of [8, Corollary 1.4.6].
Lemma 3.2. Let (Ω,A,μ) be a measure space and E an ordered Banach space, and assume
that u,v :Ω → E are μ-integrable mappings. If u(s) v(s) for a.e. s ∈ Ω , then∫
A
u(s) dμ(s)
∫
A
v(s) dμ(s) for each A ∈A.
Definition 3.1. Let Γ = {S1, . . . , SN ,u1, . . . , uN } be a normal-form game of N players whose
strategy spaces Si are closed subsets of ordered Polish spaces Xi and the utility functions ui ,
defined on S = S1 × · · · × SN , have values in ordered Banach spaces Ei . We say that probability
measures pi on Si , i = 1, . . . ,N , form a mixed-strategy for Γ if the integrals
Ui (p1, . . . , pN) =
∫
SN
· · ·
∫
S1
ui(s1, . . . , sN ) dp1(s1) · · ·dpN(sN), i = 1, . . . ,N, (3.1)
called the expected utilities of players, exist.
As for the existence of the integrals in (3.1), see, e.g., [11, Chapter VI, result M11 and Corol-
lary 5.9].
Strategies of the form
Isi (xi) =
{
1, xi = si ,
0, xi = si , si ∈ Si,
are called pure strategies for player i. The set of pure strategies for i is denoted by Pi .
We use notations x−i = (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xN) and (x1, . . . , xN) = (xi, x−i ) for N -
tuples and Y−i = Y1 × · · · × Yi−1 × Yi+1 × · · · × YN for products of sets.
Definition 3.2. Let Γ be a normal-form game. We say that mixed strategies p∗1, . . . , p∗N form a
Nash equilibrium for Γ if
p∗i ∈ argmax Ui
(·,p∗−i) for each i = 1, . . . ,N. (3.2)
A Nash equilibrium for Γ is called pure if all its strategies are pure.
In what follows we assume that all products of posets are ordered by componentwise ordering.
Assume also that for each fixed i = 1, . . . ,N the set Σi of probability measures on Si is ordered
by the first-order stochastic dominance i . Denote by p−i ∈ Σ−i also the product measure of
pj ∈ Σj , j = i. The integral
Ui(si ,p−i ) :=
∫
S
ui(si , s−i ) dp−i (s−i ) (3.3)
−i
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Definition 3.3. We say that a normal-form game Γ = {S1, . . . , SN ,u1, . . . , uN } has partially
mixed strategic complementarities if for every i = 1, . . . ,N :
(I) Si is a compact sublattice of an ordered Polish space Xi and the values of ui are in an
ordered separable Banach space Ei = (Ei,i ) with regular order cone;
(II) Ui(·,p−i ) is for each p−i ∈ Σ−i well-defined upper semi-closed function on Si , and its
range is upward directed and bounded from above;
(III) Ui(·,p−i ) is quasisupermodular for each p−i ∈ Σ−i ;
(IV) Ui has a partial single-crossing property, i.e., if xi <i yi in Si , p−i < p′−i in Σ−i , and if
p−i or p′−i belongs to P−i , then Ui(xi,p−i ) i Ui(yi,p−i ) implies that Ui(xi,p′−i ) i
Ui(yi,p
′−i ), and Ui(xi,p−i ) <i Ui(yi,p−i ) implies that Ui(xi,p′−i ) <i Ui(yi,p′−i ).
The next auxiliary result has an important role in the proof of our main results.
Lemma 3.3. Let Γ be a normal-form game which satisfies conditions (I) and (II) of Defini-
tion 3.3. Then for each i = 1, . . . ,N the sets
Fi(p−i ) := argmaxUi(·,p−i ), p−i ∈ Σ−i , (3.4)
are nonempty and compact. If also condition (III) is valid, then each Fi(p−i ) is a sublattice of Si .
Moreover,
Fi (p−i ) := argmax Ui (·,p−i ) =
{
qi ∈ Σi
∣∣qi(Fi(p−i ))= 1}, p−i ∈ Σ−i , (3.5)
and
minFi (p−i ) = IminFi(p−i ), maxFi (p−i ) = ImaxFi(p−i ), p−i ∈ Σ−i . (3.6)
Proof. Let i ∈ {1, . . . ,N} and p−i ∈ Σ−i be fixed. Conditions (I) and (II) imply by Lemma 3.1
that Fi(p−i ) is nonempty and compact. It follows from Fubini’s Theorem (cf. [11, Chapter VI,
Theorem 8.4]) that if qi ∈ Σi , and if Ui (qi,p−i ) is defined, then
Ui (qi,p−i ) =
∫
Si
Ui(si ,p−i ) dqi(si). (3.7)
Denoting ci = maxsi∈Si Ui(si ,p−i ), we then have
Ui (qi,p−i ) = ci · qi
(
Fi(p−i )
)+ ∫
Si\Fi(p−i )
Ui(si ,p−i ) dqi(si).
This result, the definition of ci and Lemma 3.2 imply that Ui (qi,p−i ) i ci , and that equality
holds if qi(Fi(p−i )) = 1. Thus qi ∈ Fi (p−i ) if and only if Ui (qi,p−i ) = ci . Consequently, if
qi ∈Fi (p−i ), then
0 = ci − Ui (qi,p−i ) =
∫
S \F (p )
(
ci − Ui(si,p−i )
)
dqi(si).i i −i
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subset of Si \ Fi(p−i ), then
0i
∫
A
(
ci − Ui(si,p−i )
)
dqi(si)i
∫
Si\Fi(p−i )
(
ci − Ui(si,p−i )
)
dqi(si) = 0.
In view of this result, the definition of ci and [11, Chapter VI, Corollary 5.16] we have qi(Si \
Fi(p−i )) = 0, whence qi(Fi(p−i )) = 1. On the other hand, if qi(Fi(p−i )) = 1, then qi(Si \
Fi(p−i )) = 0. Since Ui(si ,p−i ) = ci for each si ∈ Fi(p−i ), then Ui(·,p−i ) = ci , qi -a.e. on Si ,
whence the integral (3.7) is defined. According to Fubini’s Second Theorem (cf. [11, Chapter VI,
Theorem 8.7]) this implies that the expectation integral (3.1) is defined when pi = qi .
The above proof shows that if qi ∈ Σi , then qi ∈Fi (p−i ) if and only if qi(Fi(p−i )) = 1.
If condition (III) is valid, then each Fi(p−i ) is a compact sublattice of Si by Lemma 3.1,
whence minFi(p−i ) and maxFi(p−i ) exist. According to the definition (SD) we then have{
IminFi(p−i ) = min
{
qi ∈ Σi
∣∣qi(Fi(p−i ))= 1} and
ImaxFi(p−i ) = max
{
qi ∈ Σi
∣∣qi(Fi(p−i ))= 1}.
This result and (3.5) imply that (3.6) holds. 
Now we are ready to prove our main existence and comparison result.
Theorem 3.1. Let Γ = {S1, . . . , SN ,u1, . . . , uN } be a normal-form game having partially mixed
strategic complementarities. Then Γ has the least pure Nash equilibrium Is1, . . . , IsN and the
greatest pure Nash equilibrium Is1, . . . , IsN , and if p∗1, . . . , p∗N is any mixed Nash equilibriumfor Γ , then Isi  p∗i i Isi for each i = 1, . . . ,N .
Proof. Define a mapping F :Σ → 2Σ by
F(p) := (F1(p−1), . . . ,FN(p−N)), p = (p1, . . . , pN) ∈ Σ. (3.8)
We are going to show that F satisfies the hypotheses (h0)–(h2) and (H0)–(H2) of Theo-
rems 2.1 and 2.2. Since a = (Ia1 , . . . , IaN ), ai = minSi , i = 1, . . . ,N , and b = (Ib1 , . . . , IbN ),
bi = maxSi , i = 1, . . . ,N , belong to P and are lower and upper bounds of F[Σ], then the hy-
potheses (h0) and (H0) are valid.
To prove that (h1) holds, assume that p  p′ in Σ , and that p ∈ P . Then p−i  p′−i in Σ−i
for each i = 1, . . . ,N . It follows from Lemma 3.3 that xi = minFi(p−i ) and yi = minFi(p′−i )
exist. To prove that xi ∧ yi ∈ Fi(p−i ), assume that this is not true. Then Ui(xi ∧ yi,p−i ) <i
Ui(xi,p−i ) by (3.4), which implies by (III) that Ui(yi,p−i ) <i Ui(xi ∨ yi,p−i ). Applying this
inequality and (IV) we obtain Ui(yi,p′−i ) <i Ui(xi ∨yi,p′−i ), which contradicts with the choice
of yi . Thus xi ∧ yi ∈ Fi(p′−i ), and hence xi = xi ∧ yi , by the choice of xi . This implies that
minFi(p−i ) = xi i yi = minFi(p′−i ), so that minFi (p−i ) = Ixi i Iyi = minFi (p′−i ) by (3.6)
and (SD). This holds for each i = 1, . . . ,N , whence minF(p)minF(p′) if p  p′ in Σ and
p ∈ P . This result implies that minF(p), which belongs to P by (3.6) and (3.8), is for each
p ∈ P a lower bound of ⋃{F(p′) | p′ ∈ Σ, p  p′}. Thus the hypothesis (h1) of Theorem 2.1
is valid.
To prove that (H1) holds, assume that p  p′ in Σ , and that p′ ∈ P . Then p−i  p′−i in Σ−i
for each i = 1, . . . ,N . It follows from Lemma 3.3 that xi = maxFi(p−i ) and yi = maxFi(p′−i )
exist, and Ui(xi ∧ yi,p−i ) i Ui(xi,p−i ) by (3.4). This implies by (III) that Ui(yi,p−i ) i
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Thus xi ∨ yi ∈ Fi(p′−i ), and hence yi = xi ∨ yi , by the choice of yi . This implies that
maxFi(p−i ) = xi i yi = maxFi(p′−i ), so that maxFi (p−i ) = Ixi i Iyi = maxFi (p′−i ) by
(3.6) and (SD). This holds for each i = 1, . . . ,N , whence maxF(p)  maxF(p′) if p  p′
in Σ and p′ ∈ P . Consequently, maxF(p′), which belongs to P by (3.6) and (3.8), is for each
p′ ∈ P an upper bound of ⋃{F(p) | p ∈ Σ, p  p′}, so that the hypothesis (H1) of Theorem 2.2
is valid.
If pi = Isi , i = 1, . . . ,N , it follows from (3.1) and (3.3) that
Ui (p1, . . . , pN) = ui(s1, . . . , sN ) and Ui(si,p−i ) = ui(si , s−i ), i = 1, . . . ,N.
Moreover, if pi = Isi and p′i = Is′i , i = 1, . . . ,N , then pi i p′i in Pi if and only if si i s′i in Si .
Let C be a well-ordered chain in the set {minF(p) | p ∈ P }. Because this set is by (3.6) a subset
of P , then the elements of C are of the form p = (Is1 , . . . , IsN ), where the elements (s1, . . . , sN )
form a well-ordered chain C in S. Since S is a finite product of compact subsets Si of ordered
metric spaces Xi , then S is a compact subset of the ordered metric space X = X1 × · · · × XN
equipped with product metric and componentwise ordering. Thus all increasing sequences of C
converge in S. This property implies by [8, Proposition 1.1.5] that (s∗1, . . . , s∗N) = supC exists
in S, whence p∗ = (Is∗1 , . . . , Is∗N ) = supC in Σ , and p∗ belongs to P . This proves that the
hypothesis (h2) of Theorem 2.1 is valid.
Finally, if D is an inversely well-ordered chain in the subset {maxF(p) | p ∈ P } of P one
can show similarly that p∗ = (Is∗1 , . . . , Is∗N ) = infD exists in Σ and p∗ belongs to P , whence the
hypothesis (H2) of Theorem 2.2 holds.
It then follows from Theorems 2.1 and 2.2 that F has the least fixed point p = (Is1, . . . , IsN )
and the greatest fixed point p = (Is1, . . . , IsN ), and they belong to P . According to the definitions
(3.2) and (3.8), the first equation of (3.5) and the definition of pure strategies the above result
means that Is1, . . . , IsN is the least Nash equilibrium for Γ and Is1, . . . , IsN is the greatest Nash
equilibrium for Γ in Σ , and both are pure. 
As a consequence of Theorem 2.1 we obtain also the following comparison result.
Proposition 3.1. Let T = (T ,) be a poset, and Γ t = {S1, . . . , SN ,ut1, . . . , utN }, t ∈ T , a family
of normal-form games with partially mixed strategic complementarities. Then each Γ t has the
least pure Nash equilibrium Ist1, . . . , IstN and the greatest pure Nash equilibrium Ist1 , . . . , IstN .
Assume also that each uti(si , s−i ) has the single-crossing property in (si , t):
(V) If xi <i yi , s−i ∈ S−i and t ′ < t in T , then ut ′i (xi, s−i ) i ut
′
i (yi, s−i ) implies that
uti(xi, s−i ) i uti (yi, s−i ), and ut
′
i (xi, s−i ) <i u
t ′
i (yi, s−i ) implies that u
t
i(xi, s−i ) <i
uti(yi, s−i ).
If t ′ < t then I
st
′
i
i Isti and Ist ′i i Isti for each i = 1, . . . ,N .
Proof. The existence of least and greatest Nash equilibria for each Γ t follows from Theorem 3.1.
Define for each i = 1, . . . ,N , for each t ∈ T and for each p−i ∈ Σ−i ,
Uti (si ,p−i ) :=
∫
S
uti(si , s−i ) dp−i (s−i ), U ti (qi,p−i ) =
∫
S
Uti (si ,p−i ) dqi(si). (3.9)
−i i
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ponents of least and greatest fixed points of a multifunction F t :Σ → 2Σ , defined by{
F t (p) := (F t1(p−1), . . . ,F tN (p−N)), p = (p1, . . . , pN) ∈ Σ, where
F ti (p−i ) := argmax U ti (·,p−i ), p−i ∈ Σ−i , i = 1, . . . ,N.
(3.10)
Moreover, these extremal Nash equilibria are pure, i.e., of the form Ist1, . . . , IstN and Ist1 , . . . , IstN .
Given t ′ < t and i ∈ {1, . . . ,N} and Is−i ∈ P−i , denote F ti (Is−i ) = argmaxUti (·, Is−i ) and
F t
′
i (Is−i ) = argmaxUt
′
i (·, Is−i ). If xi = minF t
′
i (Is−i ) and yi = minF ti (Is−i ), then Ut
′
i (xi ∧ yi,
Is−i )i U t
′
i (xi, Is−i ). Equality must hold, for otherwise U
t ′
i (xi ∧ yi, Is−i ) <i Ut
′
i (xi, Is−i ). This
implies by condition (III) that Ut ′i (yi, Is−i ) <i Ut
′
i (xi ∨ yi, Is−i ), or equivalently, ut
′
i (yi, s−i ) <i
ut
′
i (xi ∨ yi, s−i ). Applying condition (V) we then obtain uti(yi, s−i ) <i uti(xi ∨ yi, s−i ), or
equivalently, Uti (yi, Is−i ) <i U
t
i (xi ∨ yi, Is−i ). But this contradicts with the choice of yi . Thus
Ut
′
i (xi ∧ yi, Is−i ) = Ut
′
i (xi, Is−i ), so that xi ∧ yi ∈ F t
′
(Is−i ). Since xi = minF t ′i (Is−i ), then
xi ∧ yi = xi , whence xi i yi , i.e., minF t ′i (Is−i ) i minF ti (Is−i ). This result, (3.6) and (SD)
imply that minF t ′i (Is−i ) i minF ti (Is−i ). This holds for all i = 1, . . . ,N and Is−i ∈ P−i ,
whence minF t ′(p)  minF t (p) for all p ∈ P . Consequently, the hypothesis (h3) of Theo-
rem 2.1 holds when F = F t and F ′ = F t ′ , so that the pt ′  pt , where pt ′ = (I
st
′
1
, . . . , I
st
′
N
)
and pt = (Ist1 , . . . , IstN ) are least fixed points of F ′ and F . In other words, if t ′ < t , then for each
i = 1, . . . ,N , I
st
′
i
i Isti , where Ist1 , . . . , IstN is the least Nash equilibrium Γ
t and I
st
′
1
, . . . , I
st
′
N
is
the least Nash equilibrium for Γ t ′ .
To prove the similar comparison result for greatest Nash equilibria of Γ t , choose xi =
maxF t
′
i (Is−i ) and yi = maxF ti (Is−i ). Then Ut
′
i (xi ∧ yi, Is−i ) i U t
′
i (xi, Is−i ). This implies by
condition (III) that Ut ′i (yi, Is−i ) i U t
′
i (xi ∨ yi, Is−i ), or equivalently, ut
′
i (yi, s−i ) i ut
′
i (xi ∨
yi, s−i ). Applying condition (V) we obtain uti(yi, s−i ) i uti(xi ∨ yi, s−i ), or equivalently,
Uti (yi, Is−i )i U ti (xi ∨yi, Is−i ). Equality must hold because of the choice of yi , whence xi ∨yi ∈
F t(Is−i ). Since yi = maxF ti (Is−i ), then xi ∨ yi = yi , whence xi i yi , i.e., maxF t
′
i (Is−i ) i
maxF ti (Is−i ). This result, allows to replace min by max in the above reasoning, thus obtaining
the asserted comparison result for greatest Nash equilibria of Γ t . 
Next we derive a comparison result for expected utilities of mixed Nash equilibria.
Proposition 3.2. Let Γ = {S1, . . . , SN ,u1, . . . , uN } be a normal-form game with partially mixed
strategic complementarities, let Is1, . . . , IsN and Is1, . . . , IsN denote the least and greatest pure
Nash equilibria of Γ , and let p∗1, . . . , p∗N be any mixed Nash equilibrium for Γ .
(a) If for each i = 1, . . . ,N ,
(VI) Ui(si,p′−i )i Ui(si ,p−i ) if p−i  p′−i in Σ−i , p−i ∈ P−i and si ∈ Si ,
then Ui (p∗1, . . . , p∗N)i ui(s1, . . . , sN) for each i = 1, . . . ,N .
(b) If for each i = 1, . . . ,N ,
(VII) Ui(si,p−i )i Ui(si ,p′−i ) if p−i  p′−i in Σ−i , p′−i ∈ P−i and si ∈ Si ,
then Ui (p∗, . . . , p∗ )i ui(s1, . . . , sN) for each i = 1, . . . ,N .1 N
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that for all i = 1, . . . ,N ,
Ui
(
p∗i , p∗−i
)= ∫
Si
Ui
(
si,p
∗−i
)
dp∗i (si)i
∫
Si
Ui(si , Is−i ) dp
∗
i (si)
= Ui
(
p∗i , Is−i
)
i Ui (Isi , Is−i ) = ui(si, s−i ).
This implies the assertion of (a).
(b) Because p∗−i  Is−i in Σ−i for all i = 1, . . . ,N , it follows from (VII) and from the equi-
librium condition (3.2) by Lemma 3.2 that for all i = 1, . . . ,N ,
Ui
(
p∗i , p∗−i
)= ∫
Si
Ui
(
si,p
∗−i
)
dp∗i (si)i
∫
Si
Ui(si , Is−i ) dp
∗
i (si)
= Ui
(
p∗i , Is−i
)
i Ui (Isi , Is−i ) = ui(si, s−i ).
This proves the assertion of (b). 
Remark 3.1. The results of this section cannot be obtained by the methods used, e.g., in [6,13,
18–21,23], because the first order stochastic dominance is not a lattice ordering for Σi if Si is
not a chain, and since the utility mappings ui need not be chain-valued. Notice also that chains
used in the proof of Theorem 3.1 are countable by [8, Proposition 1.1.6] and its dual.
Because we assume in condition (II) that Ui(·,p−i ) is only upper semi-closed, and its values
are only bounded from above, the integral
∫
Si
Ui(si ,p−i ) dpi(si) may not be defined for each
pi ∈ Σi . This means by Fubini’s Theorem (cf. [11, Chapter VI, Theorem 8.4]) that the expecta-
tion integral (3.1) may not be defined, in which case p1, . . . , pN does not form a mixed strategy
for Γ in the sense of Definition 3.1.
If Γ = {S1, . . . , SN ,u1, . . . , uN } is a normal-form game whose utility functions ui are real-
valued, then the condition (II) of Definition 3.3 can be reduced to the form:
(II′) Ui(·,p−i ) is for each p−i ∈ Σ−i upper semi-closed and bounded from above.
This property holds, for instance, if (I) holds and each ui(·, s−i ) is upper semi-continuous (cf.
the proof of Lemma 4.1).
If each Si is only a join lattice, then condition (III) is not available. The results derived above
for greatest Nash equilibria can be obtained when conditions (III) and (IV) are replaced by the
following conditions:
(III′) If xi, yi ∈ Si and p−i ∈ Σ−i , then Ui(yi,p−i )i Ui(xi,p−i ) implies that Ui(yi,p−i )i
Ui(xi ∨ yi,p−i ).
(IV′) If xi <i yi in Si , p−i < p′−i in Σ−i and p′−i belongs to P−i then Ui(xi,p−i ) i
Ui(yi,p−i ) implies that Ui(xi,p′−i )i Ui(yi,p′−i ).
These conditions correspond to concepts of weak quasisupermodularity and weak single crossing
property defined in [14, Section 4.1] for player i’s interim payoff function Vi in a Bayesian game.
Notice however the restriction p′−i ∈ P−i in condition (IV′).
Because of the partial single-crossing property: p−i or p′−i is in P−i in condition (IV), we
have to impose partial monotonicity hypotheses (h1) and (H1) on F in Theorems 2.1 and 2.2, so
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generalized iteration methods indispensable in Section 2.
4. Special cases
In this section we apply the results of Section 3 to some special cases. First we shall study a
supermodular normal-form game having increasing differences. As for examples of such games
see, e.g., [13, Section 4.4].
Definition 4.1. We say that Γ = {S1, . . . , SN ,u1, . . . , uN } is a supermodular normal-form game
having increasing differences if for every i = 1, . . . ,N :
(1) Si is a compact sublattice of an ordered Polish space Xi and ui is real-valued;
(2) ui(·, s−i ) is upper semi-continuous in Si , uniformly over s−i ∈ S−i , and ui(si , ·) is bounded
and Borel measurable in S−i for fixed si ∈ Si ;
(3) ui(·, s−i ) is supermodular, i.e., if xi, yi ∈ Si and s−i ∈ S−i , then ui(xi, s−i ) + ui(yi, s−i )
ui(xi ∧ yi, s−i ) + ui(xi ∨ yi, s−i );
(4) ui has increasing differences, i.e., if xi <i yi in Si and s−i < s′−i in S−i , then ui(yi, s−i ) −
ui(xi, s−i ) ui(yi, s′−i ) − ui(xi, s′−i ).
In the proof of our main theorem we need the following auxiliary result.
Lemma 4.1. Γ = {S1, . . . , SN ,u1, . . . , uN } be a normal-form game, and assume that conditions
(1) and (2) of Definition 4.1 hold for some i = 1, . . . ,N . Then (3.3) defines for each p−i ∈ Σ−i
a function Ui(·,p−i ) on Si which is upper semi-closed and its range is bounded from above.
Proof. Let p−i ∈ Σ−i be given. Since ui(si , ·) is by (1) and (2) real-valued, bounded and Borel
measurable in S−i for fixed si ∈ Si we can define a function f :Si →R by
f (x) =
∫
S−i
ui(x, s−i ) dp−i (s−i ). (4.1)
Because ui(·, s−i ) is upper semi-continuous in Si , uniformly over s−i ∈ S−i , then for any  > 0
each x ∈ Si has such a neighborhood V (x) in Si that ui(y, s−i ) ui(x, s−i )+  for all y ∈ V (x)
and s−i ∈ S−i . Thus
f (y) =
∫
S−i
ui(y, s−i ) dp−i (s−i )
∫
S−i
(
ui(x, s−i ) + 
)
dp−i (s−i ) = f (x) + 
for all y ∈ V (x), which proves that f is upper semi-continuous. Since Si is compact, it can
be covered by a finite number of neighborhoods V (xk), k = 1, . . . ,m. Thus f (x)max{f (xk) |
k = 1, . . . ,m}+  for each x ∈ Si , whence the range of f is bounded from above. f is also upper
semi-closed, for otherwise there exists a sequence (xn) such that xn → x in Si , f (xn) → y in R,
(f (xn)) is increasing and f (x) < y. Choosing  = y−f (x)2 , then f (xn) > f (x) +  for n large
enough, which contradicts with upper semi-continuity of f . The assertions of lemma follow then
from the above results and from the definitions (3.3) and (4.1). 
The following result is a special case of Theorem 3.1.
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increasing differences. Then Γ has the least pure Nash equilibrium Is1 , . . . , IsN and the greatest
pure Nash equilibrium Is1, . . . , IsN , and if p∗1, . . . , p∗N is any mixed Nash equilibrium for Γ , then
Isi  p
∗
i i Isi for each i = 1, . . . ,N .
Proof. It suffices to show that conditions (1)–(4) imply the corresponding conditions (I)–(IV)
of Definition 3.3. Condition (I) is a consequence of condition (1). Conditions (1) and (2) imply
by Lemma 4.1 that the functions Ui(·,p−i ), p−i ∈ Σ−i , are well-defined by (3.3) on Si for each
i = 1, . . . ,N , and that they are upper semi-closed and their ranges are bounded from above,
whence condition (II) holds.
To prove that condition (III) is valid, assume that xi, yi ∈ Si and p−i ∈ Σi . Applying condi-
tion (3) and Lemma 3.2 we get
Ui(xi,p−i ) − Ui(xi ∧ yi,p−i )
=
∫
S−i
(
ui(xi, s−i ) − ui(xi ∧ yi, s−i )
)
dp−i (s−i )

∫
S−i
(
ui(xi ∨ yi, s−i ) − ui(yi, s−i )
)
dp−i (s−i ) = Ui(xi ∨ yi,p−i ) − Ui(yi,p−i ).
This result implies the validity of condition (III).
Next we shall show that condition (IV) holds. Given i ∈ {1, . . . ,N}, assume first that p−i 
p′−i in Σ−i and that p−i = (Iz1 , . . . , Izi−1, Izi+1 , . . . , IzN ) ∈ P−i . If j = i, then Izj j p′j . The
order interval [zj ) is an increasing Borel set which contains zj . Thus 1 = Izj ([zj )) p′j ([zj )) by
the definition (SD). This result holds for each j = i, whence p′−i ([z−i )) = 1. Hence, if xi <i yi
in Si , then applying condition (4) and Lemma 3.2 we obtain
Ui(yi,p−i ) − Ui(xi,p−i ) =
∫
S−i
(
ui(yi, z−i ) − ui(xi, z−i )
)
dp−i (s−i )
= ui(yi, s−i ) − ui(xi, s−i )
=
∫
[z−i )
(
ui(yi, z−i ) − ui(xi, z−i )
)
dp′−i (s−i )

∫
[z−i )
(
ui(yi, s−i ) − ui(xi, s−i )
)
dp′−i (s−i )
=
∫
S−i
(
ui(yi, s−i ) − ui(xi, s−i )
)
dp′−i (s−i )
= Ui
(
yi,p
′−i
)− Ui(xi,p′−i).
Assume next that p−i  p′−i in Σ−i , and that p′−i = (Is′1, . . . , Is′i−1, Is′i+1, . . . , Is′N ) ∈ P−i . If
j = i, then pj j Is′j . Since the set Sj \ (s′j ] is an increasing Borel set, then pj (Sj \ (s′j ]) 
Is′j (Sj \ (s′j ]) = 0 by the definition (SD). This holds for each j = i, whence p−i ((s′−i]) = 1. If
xi <i yi in Si , then applying condition (4), the above result and Lemma 3.2 we obtain
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∫
S−i
(
ui(yi, s−i ) − ui(xi, s−i )
)
dp−i (s−i )
=
∫
(s′−i ]
(
ui(yi, s−i ) − ui(xi, s−i )
)
dp−i (s−i )

∫
(s′−i ]
(
ui
(
yi, s
′−i
)− ui(xi, s′−i))dp−i (s−i )
= ui
(
yi, s
′−i
)− ui(xi, s′−i)
=
∫
S−i
(
ui(yi, s−i ) − ui(xi, s−i )
)
dp′−i (s−i )
= Ui
(
yi,p
′−i
)− Ui(xi,p′−i).
The above proof shows that if xi <i yi in Si , p−i  p′−i in Σ−i and p−i or p′−i is in P−i , then
Ui(yi,p−i )−Ui(xi,p−i )Ui(yi,p′−i )−Ui(xi,p′−i ). This result implies that condition (IV) is
valid.
Thus all the conditions (I)–(IV) of Definition 3.3 hold, whence the assertions follow from
Theorem 3.1. 
The proof of Theorem 4.1 shows that if Γ is a supermodular normal-form game with in-
creasing differences, then Γ has partially mixed strategic complementarities. The following
comparison result is then a special case of Proposition 3.1.
Proposition 4.1. Let T = (T ,) be a poset, and Γ t = {S1, . . . , SN ,ut1, . . . , utN }, t ∈ T , a family
of supermodular normal-form games with increasing differences. Then each Γ t has the least pure
Nash equilibrium Ist1, . . . , IstN and the greatest pure Nash equilibrium Ist1 , . . . , IstN . Moreover, if
each uti(si , s−i ) has the single-crossing property (V) in (si , t), then Ist ′i i Isti and Ist ′i i Isti
whenever t ′ < t and i ∈ {1, . . . ,N}.
As a consequence of Proposition 3.2 we obtain the comparison result for the expected utilities
of mixed Nash equilibria of Γ .
Proposition 4.2. Let Γ be a supermodular normal-form game with increasing differences, let
Is1 , . . . , IsN and Is1 , . . . , IsN denote the least and greatest Nash equilibria of Γ in Σ , and let
p∗1, . . . , p∗N be any mixed Nash equilibrium for Γ .
(a) If ui(si , ·) is decreasing in S−i for all si ∈ Si , then Ui (p∗1, . . . , p∗N) ui(s1, . . . , sN).
(b) If ui(si , ·) is increasing in S−i for all si ∈ Si , then Ui (p∗1, . . . , p∗N) ui(s1, . . . , sN).
Proof. By the proof of Theorem 4.1 Γ has partially mixed strategic complementarities. Thus it
suffices by Proposition 3.2 to prove that the hypotheses (VI) and (VII) of Proposition 3.2 hold.
(a) To prove the validity of (VI), let i ∈ {1, . . . ,N} and si ∈ Si be given, and assume that
p−i  p′−i in Σ−i , and that p−i = Ix−i ∈ P−i . As in the proof of Theorem 4.1 one can show
that p′−i ([x−i )) = 1. This result and the hypothesis that ui(si , ·) is decreasing in S−i imply by
Lemma 3.2, that
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∫
S−i
ui(si , s−i ) dp−i (s−i ) = ui(si , x−i ) =
∫
[x−i )
ui(si , x−i ) dp′−i (s−i )

∫
[x−i )
ui(si , s−i ) dp′−i (s−i ) =
∫
S−i
ui(si , s−i ) dp′−i (s−i ) = Ui
(
si ,p
′−i
)
.
This result implies that condition (VI) of Proposition 3.2 holds.
(b) Assume that si ∈ Si , p−i  p′−i in Σ−i and p′−i = Is′−i ∈ P−i for each i = 1, . . . ,N .
Let i ∈ {1, . . . ,N} be given. One can show as in the proof of Theorem 4.1 that p−i ((s′−i]) = 1.
Applying this result, the hypothesis that ui(si , ·) is decreasing in S−i and Lemma 3.2 we get
Ui(si,p−i ) =
∫
S−i
ui(si , s−i ) dp−i (s−i ) =
∫
(s′−i ]
ui(si , s−i ) dp−i (s−i )

∫
(s′−i ]
ui
(
si , s
′−i
)
dp−i (s−i ) = ui
(
si, s
′−i
)= Ui(si ,p′−i).
This implies that condition (VII) of Proposition 3.2 holds. 
The next special case generalizes somewhat the results of [7, Corollary 2], and contains more-
over a comparison result.
Corollary 4.1. Let T be a poset, and let Γ t = {S1, . . . , SN ,ut1, . . . , utN }, t ∈ T , be a family of
normal-form games with the following properties:
(A) Strategy spaces are products Si =×mik=1 Sik , 1mi ∞, of compact chains Sik of ordered
Polish spaces (Xik, dik).
(B) Each uti(s1, . . . , sN ) is real-valued, upper semi-continuous in si and continuous in each sj ,
j = i, with respect to product topologies of Xi and X−i .
(C) Each uti(si , s−i ) is supermodular in si and has increasing differences in (si , s−i ) and in
(si , t), with respect to componentwise orderings of Xi and X−i .
(a) If each uti(s1, . . . , sN ) is decreasing in each sj , j = i, then each Γ t has the least pure Nash
equilibrium Ist1 , . . . , IstN , it is a lower bound of all mixed Nash equilibria for Γ
t ′
, t ′  t , and the
utilities uti(s
t
1, . . . , s
t
N ) majorize the expected utilities of all mixed Nash equilibria for Γ t .
(b) If each uti(s1, . . . , sN ) is increasing in each sj , j = i, then each Γ t has the greatest pure
Nash equilibrium Ist1, . . . , IstN , it majorizes all mixed Nash equilibria for Γ t
′
, t ′  t , and the
utilities uti(s
t
1, . . . , s
t
N ) majorize the expected utilities of all mixed Nash equilibria for Γ t .
Proof. Since each Sik is compact, it follows from Tychonoff’s Theorem [5, Theorem 2.2.8] that
Si is a compact subset of the product Xi =×mik=1 Xik . According to [5, Proposition 2.4.4] the
product topology of Xi is metrizable by the metric
di(si , s
′
i ) :=
mi∑ dik(sik, s′ik)
2k(1 + dik(sik, s′ik))
, si = (sik)mik=1, s′i =
(
s′ik
)mi
k=1 ∈ Si. (4.2)k=1
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respect to the metric di . Moreover, the products Si of chains Sik of Xik , k = 1, . . . ,mi , are
sublattices of Xi with respect to the componentwise ordering, and each ui is real-valued by (B).
Thus condition (1) of Definition 4.1 holds.
Since each uti(s1, . . . , sN ) is by (B) upper semi-continuous in si , and continuous in each sj ,
j = i, then each uti(si , s−i ) is Borel measurable in s−i by [3] and upper semi-continuous in si .
Moreover, the monotonicity hypotheses imposed on sj → uti(s1, . . . , sN ), j = i, in (a) and (b)
imply that
min
{
uti(si , a−i ), u
t
i(si , b−i )
}
 uti(si , s−i )max
{
uti(si , a−i ), u
t
i(si , b−i )
}
for all si ∈ Si , s−i ∈ S−i and t ∈ T . Thus each uti(si , s−i ) is also bounded, whence condition (2)
of Definition 4.1 holds for each t ∈ T . Because each uti(si , s−i ) is by (C) supermodular in si and
has increasing differences in (si , s−i ) and in (si , t), then conditions (3)–(5) are valid for each
t ∈ T . The assertions follow then from Theorem 4.1 and Propositions 4.1 and 4.2. 
Remark 4.1. The proofs of Theorem 4.1 and Proposition 4.2 fail if in conditions (IV), (VI) and
(VII) both p−i and p′−i belong to Σ−i \ P−i .
The results of Section 3 are applicable also to the non-mixed case. If pi = Isi and p′i = Is′i ,
i = 1, . . . ,N , then pi i p′i in Pi if and only if si i s′i in Si , so that the spaces Pi of pure
strategies, ordered by first order stochastic dominance, are order isomorphic with the strategy
spaces Si . Moreover, if pi = Isi , i = 1, . . . ,N , it follows from (3.1) and (3.3) that
Ui (p1, . . . , pN) = ui(s1, . . . , sN ) and Ui(si,p−i ) = ui(si , s−i ), i = 1, . . . ,N.
Thus we can equalize Pi ’s with Si ’s and Ui ’s with ui ’s, so that the conditions (I)–(VII), restricted
to Pi = Si , are reduced to the following form:
(i) Si is a compact sublattice of an ordered Polish space Xi and the values of ui are in an
ordered separable Banach space Ei = (Ei,i ) with regular order cone.
(ii) ui(·, s−i ) is for each s−i ∈ S−i an upper semi-closed function on Si , and its range is upward
directed and bounded from above.
(iii) Each ui(·, s−i ) is quasisupermodular.
(iv) Each ui(si , s−i ) has the single-crossing property in (si , s−i ).
(v) Each uti(si , s−i ) has the single-crossing property in (si , t).
(vi) Each ui(si , s−i ) is decreasing in s−i .
(vii) Each ui(si , s−i ) is increasing in s−i .
As an application of Theorem 3.1 and Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 we then obtain the following
result.
Proposition 4.3. . Let Γ = {S1, . . . , SN ,u1, . . . , uN } be a normal-form game.
(a) If conditions (i)–(iv) hold, then Γ has least and greatest Nash equilibria, i.e., the set of those
(s∗, . . . , s∗N) ∈ S for which
s∗i ∈ argmaxui
(·, s∗−i) for each i = 1, . . . ,N, (4.3)
has least and greatest elements.
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Nash equilibrium for Γ majorize the utilities of its all Nash equilibria.
(c) If conditions (i)–(iv) and (vii) are valid for each i = 1, . . . ,N , then the utilities of the greatest
Nash equilibrium for Γ majorize the utilities of its all Nash equilibria.
(d) Let T = (T ,) be a poset, and let Γ t = {S1, . . . , SN ,ut1, . . . , utN }, t ∈ T , be a family of
normal-form games satisfying conditions (i)–(v) for each i = 1, . . . ,N . Then each Γ t has
least and greatest Nash equilibria and they are increasing in t .
Remark 4.2. Condition (ii) holds if each ui(·, s−i ) is upper semi-continuous and real-valued
(cf. the proof of Lemma 4.1). No monotonicity or measurability hypotheses are imposed on
functions ui(si , ·) in (ii). Conditions (iii) and (iv) are the same as corresponding properties of
quasisupermodularity and of increasing differences in the definition of a normal-form game with
(ordinal) strategic complementarities (cf. [13]). Instead of real-valued utility functions assumed
in [13] they are vector-valued in Proposition 4.3.
If each Si is only a join lattice, then condition (iii) is not available. Replacing it by the follow-
ing special case of condition (III′) given in Remark 3.1:
(iii′) If xi, yi ∈ Si , s−i ∈ S−i and ui(yi, s−i )i ui(xi, s−i ), then
ui(yi, s−i )i ui(xi ∨ yi, s−i ),
the results of Proposition 4.3(a), (c) and (d) hold for greatest Nash equilibria. Moreover, the
implications for strict inequalities of conditions (iv) and (v) are not needed.
In [9] existence and comparison results are derived for games Γ with arbitrary nonempty
set I of players, and when the strategy set of player i depends on the strategy vector s−i of other
players and the utility functions are vector-valued.
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